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Abstract 
Traditional theory thinks that portfolio is not a fundamental characteristic of venture capital (VC), the literatures research 
on venture enterprise portfolio is relatively rare at home and abroad. Venture capital tends to hold a certain number of start-
up firms to form a portfolio and at the same time to provide funds and value-added services for more than one start-up firm. 
Under the scarcity of resources such as attention, venture capitalists should consider how to determine the optimal portfolio 
size of start-up firms in venture capital finance. The previous studies generally neglected the characteristic that staged 
financing is the common method used by venture capitalists in most cases. Under the staged financing mechanism, based on 
double-size moral hazard, using optimization theory we get the expression about the optimal portfolio size of venture 
capital, and then we find that the optimal portfolio size decreases in start-up capital and following capital, and increases in 
earlier stage output and total output. 
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1. Introduction 
Venture capital (VC) is characterized as providing start-up firms which have high potential growth and 
entrepreneurial talent with finance and business skills to exploit market opportunities. It is a specific type of 
financial intermediaries that provide funds, but also expertise to innovative projects. Traditional theory thinks 
that portfolio is not a fundamental characteristic of venture capital, however, portfolio investment is superior to 
single investment in performance [1], and the suitable portfolio size helps investment diversification effectively 
[2]. Venture capital investment portfolio theory should be unique and be different from the traditional portfolio 
theory on account of its characteristics compared with the securities investment and the investment of financial 
derivatives and the industrial investment. This is worthy of our in-depth study of the subject. 
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Kanniainen and Keuschnigg(2003, 2004)[3-4] first put forward the theory about venture capital portfolio, 
they pointed out that the existence of the optimal portfolio size is because: venture capitalists invest time and 
effort to manage and help the start-up firms to realize of innovation, then the resulting increase in the number 
of income portfolio firms also accordingly "diluted" the input to each enterprise's help and the value-added 
service quality meanwhile, which will reduce the probability of success of an each project and the 
entrepreneur(EN) incentive. This will force it to give entrepreneurs more shareholding ratio to maintain 
sufficient incentive, thus there must exist trade-off between value-added service strength and the number of 
portfolio firms. Based on double-size moral hazard, BernileǃCumming and Lyandres(2007)[5]set up a model 
of the optimal portfolio size of venture capital based on double-size moral hazard and discussed the influence 
mechanism of some factors on the optimal portfolio size. Fulghieri and Sevilir(2009)[6]make a portfolio size 
selecting model based on the focus of investment. They pointed out that the more concentrated investment in 
the field of investment, the more conducive to the VC to play professional knowledge to provide better value-
added services for the investment business to get better benefits. They find that the scarcity of venture capital 
will make venture capital institutions have a higher bargaining power. The model illustrates the impact of 
bargaining power and professional knowledge on the portfolio size of venture capital. But all of above studies 
have not considered the case of staged financing. 
Cumming(2006)[7]indicated that staging finance is an important factor affecting the size of venture capital 
portfolio. In this paper, we will introduce the staged financing mechanism, and analyse the decision of the 
optimal portfolio size of venture capital under staged financing. 
2. The model 
We assumed that all agents are risk-neutral, and that entrepreneurs start one firm each, have no own funds, 
and are commercially inexperienced. Consequently, they need not only finance, but also managerial advice [8-
9]. VC finances and advises a portfolio of i=1,…,n start-up firms. Generally speaking, venture capitalists are 
mainly to give capital and management support, and technological innovation is mainly dependent on 
entrepreneurs [10-11]. Neither the effort of entrepreneurs nor the extent of VC service is verifiable and 
contractible. Hence, in the different stages of the growth of the start-up firms, the role of venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs is different [12]. We roughly divided the development phase into two stages, respectively called 
technological innovation stage (stage 1) and management innovation stage (stage 2). The phase is shown below 
in table 1:
 
Table 1. Investment phase 
technological innovation stage (stage 1) management innovation stage (stage 2) 
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 
portfolio deal EN efforts results deal VC efforts results 
n I1,i  , s1,i ei  ,  cEN R1,i I2,i  , s2,i ai  , A , cVC R2,i 
Stage 1: In the first stage, the main activity of the start-up firm is technological innovation, and the main 
criterion of success or failure is the success or failure of technological innovation. In the stage, VC only 
provides to EN for start-up capital, to support entrepreneurial enterprises to carry out technological innovation 
activities. 
t=0: Venture capitalists choose to the enterprise portfolio {EN1, EN2, ... , ENn }, determine the size of the 
portfolio. 
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t=1: VC and ENi sign the first contract, VC need to give ENi start-up capital ܫଵǡ௜ in exchange for equity share 
ݏଵǡ௜.  During this period, the technological innovation is mainly dependent on the entrepreneur, so we suppose 
EN has the full bargaining power for simplicity [13-14].  
t=2: ENi choose his effort level ei based on the contract in last time. Refer to the assumption proposed by 
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg(2004)[4], we suppose that the expression of his effort cost is:ܿாே೔ሺ݁௜ሻ ൌ ߙ
௘೔భశഃ
ଵାఋ , 
where ߙǡ ߜ ൐ Ͳ. 
t=3: VC and ENi realize the technological innovation with probability ݌ଵǡ௜ሺ݁௜ሻ ൌ ݌ଵ
௘೔భషഇ
ଵିఏ , where Ͳ ൏ ߠ ൏ ͳ. 
They will get ܴଵǡ௜  if succeed or 0 if fail. 
Stage 2: The capitalist decide whether or not to give following capital and management support by judging 
the technological innovation effect in the first stage. If the technological innovation success, then venture 
capitalists will continue to invest. In the second stage, the start-up firm’s activities will focus on management 
innovation, market development and so on. The smooth development of these activities is the advantage of 
venture capitalists, the venture capitalist's efforts to determine the final output of the project. 
t=4: VC and ENi sign the second contract, VC need to give ENi following capital ܫଶǡ௜ in exchange for equity 
share ݏଶǡ௜. During this period, the management innovation is mainly dependent on the capitalist, so we suppose 
VC has the full bargaining power for simplicity [13-14]. 
t=5: VC choose the effort level ai on the project, the total effort ܣ ൌ σ ܽ௜௡௜ୀଵ .  Refer to Keuschnigg (2004) 
[15], we still suppose that: ܿ௏஼ሺܣሻ ൌ ߚ ஺
భశഄ
ଵାఌ , where ߚǡ ߝ ൐ Ͳ. 
t=6: VC and ENi realize the management innovation with probability ݌ଶǡ௜ሺܽ௜ሻ ൌ ݌ଶ
௔೔
భషഐ
ଵିఘ , where Ͳ ൏ ߩ ൏ ͳ. 
They will get the total output  ܴଶǡ௜  if succeed or 0 if fail. We suppose that ܴଶǡ௜ ب ܴଵǡ௜ , which depict an 
important feature of venture capital : If venture capitalists do not give the necessary support, then the start-up 
firms will be loosen in the management of innovation, market development and other activities, and cannot be 
further developed. 
For simplicity, we treat all start-up firms as identical. This assumption has the following realistic basis: ex-
ante information asymmetry makes VC cannot predict the operating conditions of EN, only can regard all 
enterprises as identical, and then put the same capital and management support in each project. Based on the 
homogeneity assumption, we get:ݏଵ ؠ ݏଵǡ௜Ǣ ݏଶ ؠ ݏଶǡ௜Ǣ ݌ଵ ؠ ݌ଵǡ௜Ǣ ݌ଶ ؠ ݌ଶǡ௜Ǣ ܴଵ ؠ ܴଵǡ௜Ǣ ܴଶ ؠ ܴଶǡ௜Ǣ ܫଵ ؠ ܫଵǡ௜Ǣ ܫଶ ؠ
ܫଶǡ௜Ǣ ݁ ؠ ݁௜Ǣ ܽ ؠ ܽ௜Ǣ ܿ௏஼ሺܣሻ ൌ ߚ ሺ௡௔ሻ
భశഄ
ଵାఌ . 
VC and ENi respectively maximize the expected values of their respective shares of the projects net of effort 
costs: 
ߨ௏஼ ൌ෍ሼ݌ଵǡ௜ሾሺ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ݏଵǡ௜ܴଵǡ௜ ൅ ݏଶǡ௜݌ଶǡ௜ሺܴଶǡ௜ െ ܴଵǡ௜ሻ െ ܫଶǡ௜ሿ െ ܫଵǡ௜ሽ െ ܿ௏஼  
ൌ ݊݌ଵݏଵܴଵ ൅ ݊݌ଵ݌ଶݏଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ െ ݊݌ଵܫଶ െ ݊ܫଵ െ ܿ௏஼                             (1) 
ߨாே೔ ൌ ݌ଵǡ௜ሾ൫ͳ െ ݏଵǡ௜൯ܴଵǡ௜ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݏଶǡ௜ሻ݌ଶǡ௜ሺܴଶǡ௜ െ ܴଵǡ௜ሻሿ െ ܿாே೔  
ൌ ݌ଵሺͳ െ ݏଵሻܴଵ ൅ ݌ଵ݌ଶሺͳ െ ݏଶሻሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ െ ܿாே೔   (2) 
Our analysis importantly draws on Kanniainen and Keuschnigg(2003)[3]and BernileǃCumming and 
Lyandres(2007)[5]. We will solve the problem by backward induction. 
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3. Optimal portfolio size of venture capital 
3.1. VC’s optimal effort level at t=5 
In this section we analyse the optimal effort of VC. Substituted the related expression into (1), the partial 
derivative of (1) on a is: 
߲ߨ௏஼
߲ܽ ൌ ݊݌ଵݏଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ
߲݌ଶ
߲ܽ െ
߲ܿ௏஼
߲ܽ  
(3) 
Make (3) equal to 0, we get the expression about VC’s optimal effort level: 
ܽכ ൌ ሾ݌ଶߚ
݌ଵݏଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ
݊ఌ ሿ
ଵ
ఌାఘ 
(4) 
3.2. Optimal profits share contract at t=4 
Substituted the related expression into (1), using envelope theorem, after a series of calculations we get the 
partial derivative of (1) on ݏଶ is: 
߲ߨ௏஼
߲ݏଶ ൌ ݊݌ଵ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ ൐ Ͳ 
               (5) 
From (5) we know that ߨ௏஼  increases with ݏଶ. As we mentioned above, VC has the full bargaining power 
during this period, therefore, the optimal profits share ݏଶכ ൌ ͳ. This shows that, for the value increased in the 
second stage, the share of VC obtained is 1, while the share of the entrepreneur to get 0. To be noted that the 
result depends on our bargaining power assumption, this does not affect our conclusions because the purpose of 
this paper is to discuss the optimal portfolio size of venture capital. 
3.3. EN’s optimal effort level at t=2 
Substituted the related result at t=5 and t=4 into (2), we get: 
ߨாே೔ ൌ ݌ଵሺͳ െ ݏଵሻܴଵ െ ܿாே೔                   (6) 
The partial derivative of (6) on e is: 
߲ߨாே೔
߲݁ ൌ ሺͳ െ ݏଵሻܴଵ
߲݌ଵ
߲݁ െ
߲ܿாே೔
߲݁  
(7) 
Make (7) equal to 0, we get the expression about EN’s optimal effort level: 
݁כ ൌ ቈ݌ଵߙ ሺͳ െ ݏଵሻܴଵ቉
ଵ
ఏାఋ 
(8) 
3.4. Optimal profits share contract at t=1 
From (6) and (8), using envelope theorem, after a series of calculations we can easily get: 
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߲ߨாே೔
߲ݏଵ ൌ ൤െ݌ଵ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݏଵሻ
߲݌ଵ
߲݁כ
߲݁כ
߲ݏଵ൨ ܴଵ െ
߲ܿாே೔
߲݁כ
߲݁כ
߲ݏଵ  
ൌ െ݌ଵܴଵ ൏ Ͳ                                              (9) 
From (9) we know that ߨாே೔  decreases with ݏଵ. As we mentioned above, EN has the full bargaining power 
during this period, therefore, the optimal profits share ݏଵכ ൌ Ͳ. This shows that, for the value realized in the first 
stage, the share of EN obtained is 1, while the share of the VC to be 0. 
3.5. Optimal portfolio size at t=0 
Substituted ݏଵכ ൌ Ͳ and ݏଶכ ൌ ͳ into (1), combined with (3), (4), we obtain: 
݀ߨ௏஼
݀݊ ൌ ሺ݌ଶ ൅ ݊
߲݌ଶ
߲ܽכ
߲ܽכ
߲݊ ሻ݌ଵሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ െ ݌ଵܫଶ െ ܫଵ െ
߲ܿ௏஼
߲ܽכ
߲ܽכ
߲݊  
ൌ ݌ଵ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ െ ݌ଵܫଶ െ ܫଵ                (10) 
݀ଶߨ௏஼
݀݊ଶ ൌ െ
ߝሺͳ െ ߩሻ
ߝ ൅ ߩ
݌ଵ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ
݊ ൏ Ͳ 
(11) 
From (11) we see ߨ௏஼  is a concave function on parameter ݊, which means there exist only ݊כ  satisfied ௗగೇ಴
ௗ௡ ൌ Ͳ. In other words, a unique optimal number of portfolio start-up firms exist. Substituted the expression 
of ݌ଶ into (10), and make (10) equal to 0, we obtain: 
݊כ ൌ ቐ ሾ݌ଵ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻሿ
ଵାఌ
ଵିఘ
ߚሾሺͳ െ ߩሻሺ݌ଵܫଶ ൅ ܫଵሻሿ
ఌାఘ
ଵିఘ
ቑ
ଵ
ఌ
 
(12) 
Hereto we get the optimal portfolio size of venture capital under staged financing. Using (12), giving the 
parameter value, the venture capital institutions can calculate their optimal number of portfolio start-up firms 
specifically. 
4. Comparative static analysis 
Consider the relationship between parameter ߚ and ݊כ, ݊כ decreases with ߚ obviously. It means that if the 
effort costly the venture capital will invest a small number of start-up firms. The result is consistent with the 
viewpoint of Kanniainen and Keuschnigg(2003)[3]and BernileǃCumming and Lyandres(2007)[5]. We will 
analyse how ݊כ effected byܫଵǡ ܫଶǡ ܴଵǡ ܴଶ particularly. Now we give the two propositions as below: 
Proposition 1: The optimal portfolio size of venture capital under staged financing ݊כ decreases in start-up 
capital ܫଵ and following capital ܫଶ. 
Proposition 2: The optimal portfolio size of venture capital under staged financing ݊כ increases in earlier 
stage output ܴଵ and total output ܴଶ. 
Proofs see Appendix. 
Intuitively, the optimal portfolio size is positively related to the profitability of each venture. Thus, a higher 
value of a successful project, and lower required initial investment and following investment result in a higher 
value of each venture and in a larger optimal portfolio size. The crucial assumption in BernileǃCumming and 
Lyandres(2007)[5], however, is that the profit sharing rule is determined exogenously. In our paper, we assume 
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that VC and EN have full bargaining power in the different stages, so the profit sharing rule is certain. The 
assumption does not change the result about the analysis. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper develops a theoretical model of venture capital portfolio by introducing the staged financing 
mechanism. Venture capitalists have to consider whether the benefits brought by portfolio can offset the cost of 
building a portfolio under the scarcity of resources. We obtain the specific expression of the optimal portfolio 
size of venture capital under staged financing based on double-size moral hazard and make a comparative static 
analysis, and then we find that the portfolio enterprise number is decreasing in initial capital and following 
capital, and is increasing in earlier stage output and total output, which to be consistent with the empirical 
results in [16-17]. 
The theory and application of the traditional investment portfolio has been mature, however, the study of 
investment portfolio theory of venture capital has just begun, and has not yet formed a mature theoretical 
system. In this paper, the staged financing mechanism has been introduced which provides a method for 
venture capital institutions to make a scientific investment portfolio decision. We must see that our analysis 
having some limitation. For example, we divide the investment phase into two stages roughly. In reality, VC 
may invest to a project more than two times. Generalized the model to more than two stages is necessary, 
which is our further research direction. 
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Appendix A.  
A.1. Some useful expressions 
߲ܿாே೔ሺ݁௜ሻ
߲݁௜ ൌ
ͳ ൅ ߜ
݁௜ ܿாே೔ሺ݁௜ሻ 
߲ܿ௏஼ሺܣሻ
߲ܽ ൌ
ͳ ൅ ߝ
ܽ௜ ܿ௏஼ሺܣሻ 
߲݌ଵǡ௜ሺ݁௜ሻ
߲݁௜ ൌ
ͳ െ ߠ
݁௜ ݌ଵǡ௜ሺ݁௜ሻ 
߲݌ଶǡ௜ሺܽ௜ሻ
߲ܽ௜ ൌ
ͳ െ ߩ
ܽ௜ ݌ଶǡ௜ሺܽ௜ሻ 
߲݁כ
߲ݏଵ ൌ െ
ͳ
ߠ ൅ ߜ
݁כ
ͳ െ ݏଵ 
߲݁כ
߲ܴଵ ൌ
ͳ
ߠ ൅ ߜ
݁כ
ܴଵ 
߲ܽכ
߲ݏଶ ൌ
ͳ
ߝ ൅ ߩ
ܽכ
ݏଶ 
߲ܽכ
߲݊ ൌ െ
ߝ
ߝ ൅ ߩ
ܽכ
݊  
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1 
݀ߨ௏஼
݀݊ ൌ ݌ଵ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ െ ݌ଵܫଶ െ ܫଵ ൌ Ͳ 
(A.1) 
The partial derivative of (A.1) on ܫଵ is: 
݌ଵሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ
߲݌ଶ
߲ܽכ
߲ܽכ
߲݊
߲݊
߲ܫଵ ൌ ͳ 
Substituted the related expressions, so we get: 
߲݊
߲ܫଵ ൌ െ
ߝ ൅ ߩ
ߝሺͳ െ ߩሻ
݊
݌ଵ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ ൏ Ͳ 
Similarly, the partial derivative on ܫଶ is: 
݌ଵሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ
߲݌ଶ
߲ܽכ
߲ܽכ
߲݊
߲݊
߲ܫଶ ൌ ݌ଵ 
Substituted the related expressions, so we get: 
߲݊
߲ܫଶ ൌ െ
ߝ ൅ ߩ
ߝሺͳ െ ߩሻ
݊
݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ ൏ Ͳ 
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A.3.   Proof of Proposition 2 
߲݌ଵ
߲ܴଵ ൌ
߲݌ଵ
߲݁כ
߲݁כ
߲ܴଵ ൌ
ͳ െ ߠ
ߠ ൅ ߜ
݌ଵ
ܴଵ 
(A.2) 
Substituted (A.1) into (4), we get: 
ሺܽכሻଵାఌ ൌ ͳ െ ߩߚ ሺ݌ଵܫଶ ൅ ܫଵሻሺ݊
כሻିఌ 
The partial derivative of above formula on ܴଵ is: 
߲ܽ
כ
߲ܴଵ ൌ
ܽכ
ͳ ൅ ߝ ሾ
ͳ െ ߠ
ߠ ൅ ߜ
ͳ
݌ଵ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ െ
ߝ
݊כ
߲݊כ
߲ܴଵሿ 
So: 
߲݌ଶ
߲ܴଵ ൌ
߲݌ଶ
߲ܽכ
߲ܽכ
߲ܴଵ 
ൌ ͳ െ ߩͳ ൅ ߝ ݌ଶሾ
ͳ െ ߠ
ߠ ൅ ߜ
ͳ
݌ଵ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ െ
ߝ
݊כ
߲݊כ
߲ܴଵሿ 
(A.3) 
The partial derivative of (A.1) on ܴଵ is: 
݌ଵሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ
߲݌ଶ
߲ܴଵ ൅ ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ
߲݌ଵ
߲ܴଵ െ ܫଶ
߲݌ଵ
߲ܴଵ െ ݌ଵ݌ଶ ൌ Ͳ 
                      (A.4) 
Substituted (A.2) and (A.3) into (A.4), we obtain: 
߲݊כ
߲ܴଵ ൌ
ͳ െ ߠ
ܴଵሺߠ ൅ ߜሻ ሺܫଵ ൅
ͳ െ ߩ
ͳ ൅ ߝ ݌ଵሻ
ߝሺͳ െ ߩሻ
ͳ ൅ ߝ
݌ଵܫଶ ൅ ܫଵ݊כ
൐ Ͳ 
Similarly, notice that
డ௣భ
డோమ ൌ Ͳ, we can get: 
߲ܽכ
߲ܴଶ ൌ െ
ܽכ
ͳ ൅ ߝ
ߝ
݊כ
߲݊כ
߲ܴଶ 
So: 
߲݌ଶ
߲ܴଶ ൌ
߲݌ଶ
߲ܽכ
߲ܽכ
߲ܴଶ ൌ െ
ߝሺͳ െ ߩሻ
ͳ ൅ ߝ
݌ଶ
݊כ
߲݊כ
߲ܴଶ 
(A.5) 
The partial derivative of (A.1) on ܴଶ is: 
݌ଵሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ
߲݌ଶ
߲ܴଶ ൅ ݌ଶሺܴଶ െ ܴଵሻ
߲݌ଵ
߲ܴଶ െ ܫଶ
߲݌ଵ
߲ܴଶ ൅ ݌ଵ݌ଶ ൌ Ͳ 
                       (A.6) 
Substituted (A.5) and (
డ௣భ
డோమ ൌ Ͳ) into (A.6), we obtain: 
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߲݊כ
߲ܴଶ ൌ
ͳ ൅ ߝ
ߝሺͳ െ ߩሻ
݊כ
ܴଶ െ ܴଵ ൐ Ͳ
